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Historical inequality is back on the academic agenda 
Before delving into the actual topic of this paper – wealth inequality in pre-
industrial Europe and more specifically the cases of relatively low inequality and 
their causes – I would like to say a few words about the wider topic of economic 
inequality. First, it may be noted how, in recent years, income and wealth inequality 
have come back into the picture, in academia and society. Debates about inequality 
have also changed in character. In previous decades, if discussed at all, discussions 
were mostly fueled by social concerns about the injustice or unfairness of high ma-
terial inequality. Levels of inequality were mostly seen as an outcome of economic, 
social of political developments and decisions, that is: as a dependent variable, and the 
focus in academic and societal debates was mainly on income inequality and the re-
sulting disparities in consumption opportunities. This has changed in recent years. 
Discussions have become more extensive and they became more focused on the 
real or perceived effects of economic inequality. First and foremost the effects of 
inequality on economic growth and development, but also the issue of the compat-
ibility of high economic inequality with the functioning of democratic and inclusive 
societies has been raised.1 Accordingly, the focus of debates has shifted more to 
wealth inequality and to inequality as an independent variable: as a cause. The ef-
fects of wealth inequality, it is argued, may materialize both directly, through nega-
tive effects on participation of people in the economy, human capital formation or 
investments, or indirectly, through the growing leverage of wealth owners or the 
erosion of societal cohesion and resilience. 
Striking in the recent debates about inequality is also the interest in historical 
developments and the insights they offer in the causes and effects of inequality. 
This is understandable from several insights won over recent years. First, it is has 
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become clear that there is no equilibrium in material inequality, with levels of ine-
quality being steered, for instance by forces of supply and demand, towards some 
kind of natural balance. On the contrary, levels of inequality can substantially and 
fundamentally change over time, as is now becoming clear especially by way of em-
pirical historical research. Second, it has become clear that history is not a unilinear 
march from societies that are characterized by poverty, arbitrary power of rulers, 
coercion and high inequality to societies that offer wellbeing, material equality and 
equitable outcomes. In the older literature, these latter societies were often equated 
with the Western ideal type societies of the second half of the twentieth century, 
which were seen as the realization of historical progress or as the fruit of moderni-
zation. Their fruition would make any comparison to the historical past useless. 
However, this idea, too, is left in recent years and dismissed as overly teleological. It 
has become clear, as a result of both empirical and more theoretical studies, that 
also modern, Western societies can generate high levels of inequality. Modernity, 
therefore, cannot be automatically equated with equality. 
This links up with, third, the dismissal of the Kuznets curve, which often has 
been dominant in the thinking about the historical development of inequality. Es-
pecially in the older literature, the relationship between inequality and economic 
growth was approached within the framework of this curve, which describes how 
the first phase of economic growth leads to rising (income) inequality, but the sec-
ond phase to a reduction of inequality.2 Kuznets suggested that this reduction of 
inequality was the result of the dynamism and ongoing economic growth and the 
sectoral changes associated with the growth process. Even though Kuznets focused 
on a very specific part of history, that is, developments in the Western World in the 
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, and he himself was very cautious 
in his interpretation, his curve of first rising and next declining inequality under 
economic growth conditions was long assumed to hold more generally. This idea of 
a Kuznets curve is now shown to be flawed, however, both with respect to causali-
ty and chronology. Regarding causality, it has been remarked that, even if a curve-
like development is found in specific cases, the curve is still more a descriptive than 
an analytic instrument, and the elements forming the causal link between economic 
growth and inequality remain unclear.3 In uncovering this causality, the focus likely 
has to be more on social and political factors than solely economic ones. What 
Kuznets actually observed in his research is the decline of inequality in the United 
States from the First World War, which was not an automatic result of economic 
growth, but rather that of growing self-organization, social unrest, political reforms 
and a resulting rise of state redistribution, stimulated further by the need to co-opt 
workers as soldiers in the mass mobilization during the world wars and the ensuing 
Cold War.4 We thus need more specific empirical tests for longer historical periods, 
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using the historical record, in order to unravel the causality of growing and declin-
ing inequality.5 And we need to place changes in levels of material inequality much 
more closely within their historical context, and within their social and political set-
ting, in order to arrive at explanations. 
The positive result of these recent insights is that the historical dimension and 
the use of historical data have become an integral part of the thinking about ine-
quality. This is reflected in the recent works by Thomas Piketty, Daron Acemoglu 
and James Robinson, Branko Milanovic and Walter Scheidel, for instance.6 It is no-
ticeable that these works readily include pre-industrial periods; actually, they do not 
postulate any fundamental divide between the industrial and pre-industrial period. 
This is related to the dismissal of modernization thinking and of the idea that the 
present is fundamentally different from the past. It is now clear that mechanisms 
that were at play in the past still hold, albeit sometimes in different forms and mani-
festations, and this makes it more relevant to look back to the past, including the 
more distant one. This insight makes the pre-industrial period more relevant than 
ever before in understanding economic and social development more generally. 
In their treatment of the pre-industrial period, these influential, recent works 
have in common that they look at very long, grand developments, generally at a 
macro-level. Until recently, however, not a lot was known about the actual mecha-
nisms of the development of economic inequality in the pre-industrial period and 
its effects. This is not to say that inequality, or property distribution, has never been 
investigated by historical researchers. Actually, the 1970s and 1980s saw a fairly 
large number of scholars interested in this topic, producing a multitude of publica-
tions. One can think of the publications by Lee Soltow, particularly on wealth ine-
quality in Scandinavia.7 Also, there was a host of regional monographies, especially 
for France, where the distribution of land, as main wealth component, was amply 
discussed.8 Also, in this period, there was a large number of studies published in the 
context of the so-called Brenner debate, or transition debate, where social property 
systems, and the distribution of property as their main constituent, were in the fo-
cus of attention. Different than today, scholars were mainly interested in the distri-
bution of property over different social groups, as between peasants, burghers, 
noblemen and religious institutions, and the changes this distribution displayed 
over time, and figures were mainly presented this way. Because of this difference in 
presentation and focus, and also because underlying data is often not digitized and 
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hard to access, these studies are hardly integrated in the current debates on eco-
nomic inequality, even though they may have relevant things to offer, especially in 
the analyses and interpretations they offered. 
Moreover, after the 1980s interest in this topic has waned and, with this, the 
older literature went out of the picture. One could even say that a gap in our 
knowledge has arisen, up to the very recent moment that the topic entered the re-
search agenda again. This may have caused conclusions in this recent literature that 
perhaps are too hasty. One prominent scholar of inequality recently even stated that 
only accidental or exogenous events, including epidemics and wars, have changed 
inequality in pre-industrial economies, since the endogenous forces of economic 
development of the modern era that now shape inequality patterns were absent.9 
Also, since the recent research is often highly quantitative and undertaken by econ-
omists, there sometimes is a lack of knowledge about the context of economic ine-
quality, while historians would argue that contextualization is crucial. Figures by 
themselves do not say a lot. A historical approach to inequality enables us to con-
textualize inequality and its evolving meaning for different groups and societies. 
Furthermore, it allows us to go beyond the level of ‘national statistics’ on aggregate 
evolutions of inequality. These national statistics conform to the present-day nation 
states, which seldom are the relevant units of analysis for the pre-industrial period. 
Moreover, by aggregating data for different regions, with very different economic, 
social and political characteristics, these ‘national statistics’ obscure important vari-
ables.10 Only by going beyond aggregated statistics and delving into these separate 
regions enables us to reveal and explain the mechanisms which drive inequality and 
its effects. 
It is, therefore, good to see that over the past years a lot of progress has been 
made in measuring income and wealth inequality in pre-industrial Europe and in 
understanding its causes and effects. The Datini conference of 2019 testifies to this 
progress. It also testifies to the fact that progress has not only been made for 
Great-Britain and the Low Countries, the parts of Europe which in recent decades 
have often been center-stage in international studies on pre-industrial economic de-
velopment, but also, or perhaps even particularly, for Italy and the Iberian peninsu-
la.11 The picture thus becomes broader and richer, and this is important in order to 
arrive at more comprehensive insights. 
Here, I will not try to recapitulate all the studies presented at the conference. I 
would like to focus on one particular issue, the occurrence of regions and periods 
were levels of wealth inequality were relatively low, and try to arrive at an inventory 
of possible causes of these exceptions, by building on the existing literature and in-
cluding some of the insights won at the Datini conference. 
 
9 B. MILANOVIC, Global inequality: A new approach for the Age of Globalization, Cambridge, London 
2016, pp. 62 and, even more explicitly, 69. 
10 See the work by Erik Thoen on social agro-systems. 
11 I am thinking of the work by Antoni Furió and, especially, Guido Alfani, but more generally of 
all the scholars from Milano, Pavia, Napoli, Roma, Udine, Girona, Pamplona, Sevilla, Valencia and 
Barcelona who have recently published new work on this topic and presented their work at the Datini 
conference. 
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High levels of income and wealth inequality in pre-industrial Europe 
Compared to the yardstick of modern, European societies levels of income and 
wealth inequality in pre-industrial Europe are high in two ways. First, levels were 
high in an absolute way, with income inequality roughly at a Gini of 0.4 to 0.6 and 
wealth at 0.6 to 0.9.12 These figures need to be carefully evaluated in in view of the 
source and measurement issues, which are amply discussed in several papers in this 
conference volume.13 Also, even if these figures are calculated with necessary scru-
tiny, they are still not telling by themselves, as each figure needs to be contextual-
ized and not taken at face value. Still, they do allow for the conclusion that pre-
industrial inequality levels were generally higher than levels as we know them from 
twentieth-century Europe. Using the Gini as a measure, makes it difficult to tell 
whether this difference is found mainly in the extremes at the bottom and top of 
the distribution, or rather in the relative strength of the middle groups. Systemati-
cally showing and discussing deciles alongside Gini’s could help bringing more clar-
ity on this point.14 What we can observe, however, is that the difference is 
pronounced especially for (net) income inequality, which in Europe in the second 
half of the twentieth century was substantially lower than in the pre-industrial peri-
od. Second, levels of pre-industrial inequality are very high in a relative way, that is, 
compared to what people would need as bare necessities. For income, only the part 
can be claimed by the rich that is not needed by the poor for subsistence. In the 
pre-industrial period, with levels of annual income being far lower than today, this 
is a big issue. Mathematically, this can be expressed in an inequality possibility fron-
tier, which rises with the rise of annual income.15 In view of this inequality frontier, 
figures of income inequality for pre-industrial Europe are even more impressive 
(that is: relatively higher) than the absolute figures suggest. 
When focusing on wealth inequality, this inequality frontier is less of an issue, 
as there is no such subsistence level at play, and figures can thus more readily be 
compared over periods, even though they still need to be critically assessed, also in 
the light of source problems, and to be carefully contextualized. This paper will 
concentrate on wealth inequality, also because it plays an important role as inde-
pendent variable and as cause of further economic, social and political changes, as 
recent literature suggests, and much more so than income inequality does.16 Even 
though there is, of course, a relation between income and wealth inequality, it is not 
 
12 B. MILANOVIC, Towards an explanation of inequality in premodern societies. The role of colonies, 
urbanization, and high population density, in “Economic History Review”, 71, 2018, n. 4, pp. 1029-1047, 
1033, and many other references including those in the papers in this volume. 
13 Including the papers by Héctor García Montero on Catalonia and Guido Alfani on Italy. 
14 The Gini coefficient, therefore, is by no means a perfect measure. Still, I will use it here, and 
refrain from discussing deciles, since this is an overview paper and Gini’s are the yardstick that is best 
available for most of the cases. 
15 B. MILANOVIC, P.H. LINDERT, J. G. WILLIAMSON, Pre-Industrial inequality, in “The Economic 
Journal”, 551, 2011, n. 121, pp. 255-272. See also: the introduction to this conference by Paolo 
Malanima. 
16 See for this, apart from the works mentioned above also: B.J.P. VAN BAVEL, The Invisible Hand? 
How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined since AD 500, Oxford 2016. 
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a linear and direct one,17 and both causes and effects are different per type of ine-
quality, so I will limit myself here to wealth inequality. For the pre-industrial period 
data on wealth inequality generally are more extensive and often more reliable than 
data on income inequality, as for the latter often no more than proxies or partial 
indicators are available. The availability of data and of relevant studies especially 
applies to Western Europe (the Low Countries, the Iberian Peninsula, Italy) on 
which this paper will therefore concentrate, even though I have tried to include in-
formation for other areas, when available. 
As noted above, much more so than with regard to (net) income inequality, 
high levels of wealth inequality at present are ubiquitous in many parts of the world, 
and even in European societies wealth inequality in recent decades is rising again, 
while in the United States they are even rising back to the high levels we know of 
the nineteenth century.18 When going over the world as a whole and history as a 
whole, it would probably be correct to conclude that high levels of wealth inequali-
ty, with Gini’s of 0.7-0.9, are the norm. A first large exception to this norm is 
formed by the early, small-scale societies of pre- and proto-historical periods, as in-
equality levels generally were lower, at Gini’s of around 0.4-0.6, or even much lower 
still for small-scale societies of hunter-gatherers, foragers and horticulturalists.19 We 
should be critical of exact figures presented in the literature, because of source and 
measurement problems, but it seems safe to conclude that levels in these periods 
were substantially lower. The second large exception is formed by the societies we 
know best: those we have seen in a large part of the twentieth century, and especial-
ly in the decades around the middle of the century, as some European countries 
may have stood at wealth inequality levels of 0.5-0.6. These low levels of the mid-
twentieth century we sometimes implicitly take as “normal”, but in recent decades, 
figures in many European countries have risen to substantially higher levels again. 
More importantly, these low levels of the mid-twentieth century are not the norm 
in history, but an exception.20 The rest of history, including pre-industrial Europe, 
has high levels of wealth inequality. 
The latter conclusion is endorsed by what we now are starting to find out about 
the more abstract driving forces behind wealth inequality. Both mathematically, 
conceptually and empirically it can be shown that wealth has the tendency to be-
come very unequally distributed, even without any further specific cause.21 The 
 
17 Even though studies will find a linear relationship for some cases, as for eighteenth-century 
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larger the scale, the more profound this process is. Moreover, levels of wealth ine-
quality are broadly found to rise with economic development and economic 
growth, with population growth and larger concentrations of people and with ur-
banization, and with the rise of larger, bureaucratic states and their fiscal systems, 
that is, all the processes gradually and intermittently taking place in pre-industrial 
Europe in the period 1000-1800. This means, in the light of all these inequality-
enhancing mechanisms, that lower levels of wealth inequality can only have been 
reached as a result of countervailing forces. Which of these forces exist? 
Among the possible factors especially catastrophes have recently been high-
lighted. The thesis of Scheidel’s “The Great Leveler”, and several other influential 
recent works, is that levels of inequality can be reduced only as a result of cata-
strophic events, including state collapse, massive plague, violent revolutions and, 
most particularly, mass-mobilization warfare. The latter, and most particularly the 
devastating two World Wars, would also be the main reason for the twentieth-
century exception to the rule of high wealth inequality.22 
Is this indeed correct? Can we find other societies in history that have relatively 
low levels of wealth inequality? Pre-industrial Western Europe with its diversity of 
societies and coordination systems, and its rich documentation, offers a great op-
portunity to check this. It is, surprisingly, also a part of history that is not well in-
cluded in the influential literature mentioned here, as this mostly focuses on 
classical antiquity or non-European cases and on nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
history. Using the historical record of pre-industrial Europe would allow us to ad-
duce many relatively well-documented cases,23 to see whether other cases of limited 
wealth inequality exist and also to see what the causes of these relatively low levels 
of wealth inequality are. I will try to do so here, not by exhaustively going over all 
the literature available, but more as a kind of thought-experiment, in order to see 
whether indeed only catastrophic events were able to bring inequality down or also 
more peaceful ways were able to do so? I will try and offer a kind of inventory of 
possible inequality-reducing mechanisms, focused on pre-industrial Western Eu-
rope, in order to make a start in answering these questions. 
2. CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 
 War and mass mobilization 
Most highlighted in recent literature as a decisive factor in reducing wealth ine-
quality, or even the only possible factor in reducing inequality, are catastrophic 
events, most particularly mass-mobilization warfare.24 There are several ways in 
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a linear and direct one,17 and both causes and effects are different per type of ine-
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may have stood at wealth inequality levels of 0.5-0.6. These low levels of the mid-
twentieth century we sometimes implicitly take as “normal”, but in recent decades, 
figures in many European countries have risen to substantially higher levels again. 
More importantly, these low levels of the mid-twentieth century are not the norm 
in history, but an exception.20 The rest of history, including pre-industrial Europe, 
has high levels of wealth inequality. 
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the more abstract driving forces behind wealth inequality. Both mathematically, 
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come very unequally distributed, even without any further specific cause.21 The 
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most particularly, mass-mobilization warfare. The latter, and most particularly the 
devastating two World Wars, would also be the main reason for the twentieth-
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societies and coordination systems, and its rich documentation, offers a great op-
portunity to check this. It is, surprisingly, also a part of history that is not well in-
cluded in the influential literature mentioned here, as this mostly focuses on 
classical antiquity or non-European cases and on nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
history. Using the historical record of pre-industrial Europe would allow us to ad-
duce many relatively well-documented cases,23 to see whether other cases of limited 
wealth inequality exist and also to see what the causes of these relatively low levels 
of wealth inequality are. I will try to do so here, not by exhaustively going over all 
the literature available, but more as a kind of thought-experiment, in order to see 
whether indeed only catastrophic events were able to bring inequality down or also 
more peaceful ways were able to do so? I will try and offer a kind of inventory of 
possible inequality-reducing mechanisms, focused on pre-industrial Western Eu-
rope, in order to make a start in answering these questions. 
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quality, or even the only possible factor in reducing inequality, are catastrophic 
events, most particularly mass-mobilization warfare.24 There are several ways in 
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which warfare potentially reduces wealth inequality. First, through the destruction 
of capital goods, a capacity that war has in common with other disasters that de-
stroy capital goods, including earthquakes, city fires and floods. War-related de-
struction and capital losses could be caused by marauding armies, sieges, pillaging, 
extortion, burned soil policies and tactical destruction, as happened with the delib-
erate inundations of polders, for instance. Material losses, as well as losses of lives, 
could be substantial,25 even though not on the large geographical scale of modern 
wars, but mainly at a regional or even local scale. 
The effect of war destruction on wealth inequality is not unidirectional and au-
tomatic; it could both reduce or increase wealth inequality, and often the effect on 
wealth distribution was limited, especially in the long run. For instance, even in a 
very hard-hit town as Prato, in Tuscany, hit by the sack of 1512 and the massive 
pillaging and killing that went on, wealth inequality was only slightly changed, from 
a Gini of 0.62 in 1487 to 0.58 in 1546, the dates closest by the terrible event.26 The 
only concrete instance of a substantial and more lasting reduction of wealth ine-
quality in a war-hit town I came across in the literature, is Augsburg in the first half 
of the seventeenth century, during the Thirty Year War.27 This case is very excep-
tional, however, because of the combination of war with heavy billeting, urban 
bankruptcy, plague and general loss of Augsburg’s trading position, making the ef-
fect of war hard to isolate. This applies to the Thirty Year War more in general, be-
ing one of the few pre-industrial wars which does seem to have brought a more 
substantial reduction of wealth inequality,28 but in an area and period which also 
saw epidemics, state failure, disruption of the fiscal system and economic decline, 
phenomena in part connected to the war but not wholly so. Apart from this mas-
sive, long-lasting and highly-destructive war, I did not come across cases of war-
induced reduction of wealth inequality. 
More importantly perhaps, much of the effect of war depended on the local 
context, especially the institutional one. The effects of war were never wholly di-
rect, but mediated by the local and regional institutions, as shown for the effects of 
the Italian Wars in the first half of the sixteenth century on the heavily affected 
Geradadda region in Lombardy, with the organization for the management of the 
commons, and systems for credit and redistribution, playing a large part in the ef-
fects, in this case keeping wealth inequality fairly stable.29 Also, the rules regarding 
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the division of costs of repair of houses and capital goods or other investments af-
ter destruction, as laid down in lease contracts, or in bylaws of town communities 
or water management organizations, for instance, could co-determine the effect of 
war destruction on the distribution of wealth. One can think of a region, as the 
Dutch river area, where the close alliance between large landowners and big tenants 
farmers in the aftermath of war-related destruction, as in 1543, led to the use of in-
stitutional arrangements for capital replenishment and leasing which resulted in 
both a relatively quick recovery of economic operations and to a strengthening of 
the position of the same big farmers.30 
Second, warfare could reduce wealth inequality through the necessity to main-
tain a large group of propertied soldiers. Examples of this in pre-industrial Europe, 
however, are rather exceptional and they are mostly of cases where the role of peo-
ple as soldiers was not the prime goal but rather one component within a broader 
societal constellation. One of these examples are the farmer-colonists in twelfth-
century Holland, who all received a family holding in property, as a reward for their 
hard clearing work, but with the obligation of having to serve and to organize a 
ship with rowers per district in case of war.31 Similar obligations of free, landown-
ing peasants also existed in Scandinavia. The guild militias and other armies com-
posed of citizen-soldiers in the late medieval towns are another example,32 as these 
were composed mainly of independent artisans and other men who possessed their 
own means of production. These militias were thus linked to a social fabric with 
relatively large propertied middle groups and a more limited level of wealth inequal-
ity. These propertied middling groups also came to the fore during the English Civil 
War in the mid-seventeenth century, as several commentators, inspired by the 
works of Machiavelli, promoted the idea that soldiers should be propertied free-
holders, that is, citizen-soldiers who were free and independent because of their 
ownership of property, most particularly land.33 This was exceptional, however, 
since already in the course of the late Middle Ages in many societies popular mili-
tias were disbanded and replaced by employing professional soldiers, hired in the 
labour market.34 More generally, the capacity to use and organize the means of vio-
lence in pre-industrial Europe was exactly the reserve of the elite and formed a cor-
nerstone of their elevated material position and property, and a way to defend this 
property. Violence capacity thus mostly had the opposite effect: of legitimizing and 
sustaining high levels of inequality. 
Third, warfare could reduce wealth inequality through the need to maintain the 
loyalty of the ordinary population (through taxing the rich in order to pay for war-
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tional, however, because of the combination of war with heavy billeting, urban 
bankruptcy, plague and general loss of Augsburg’s trading position, making the ef-
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substantial reduction of wealth inequality,28 but in an area and period which also 
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phenomena in part connected to the war but not wholly so. Apart from this mas-
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hard clearing work, but with the obligation of having to serve and to organize a 
ship with rowers per district in case of war.31 Similar obligations of free, landown-
ing peasants also existed in Scandinavia. The guild militias and other armies com-
posed of citizen-soldiers in the late medieval towns are another example,32 as these 
were composed mainly of independent artisans and other men who possessed their 
own means of production. These militias were thus linked to a social fabric with 
relatively large propertied middle groups and a more limited level of wealth inequal-
ity. These propertied middling groups also came to the fore during the English Civil 
War in the mid-seventeenth century, as several commentators, inspired by the 
works of Machiavelli, promoted the idea that soldiers should be propertied free-
holders, that is, citizen-soldiers who were free and independent because of their 
ownership of property, most particularly land.33 This was exceptional, however, 
since already in the course of the late Middle Ages in many societies popular mili-
tias were disbanded and replaced by employing professional soldiers, hired in the 
labour market.34 More generally, the capacity to use and organize the means of vio-
lence in pre-industrial Europe was exactly the reserve of the elite and formed a cor-
nerstone of their elevated material position and property, and a way to defend this 
property. Violence capacity thus mostly had the opposite effect: of legitimizing and 
sustaining high levels of inequality. 
Third, warfare could reduce wealth inequality through the need to maintain the 
loyalty of the ordinary population (through taxing the rich in order to pay for war-
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fare), as argued for modern cases.35 In the pre-industrial period, war was indeed one 
of the main motivations for taxation. However, in the Middle Ages this taxation 
was only occasional and tax rates were quite low, so this did not have a strong ef-
fect on wealth inequality. In the early modern period, taxes became more general 
and substantial, but the taxes levied by central rulers in order to cover military ex-
penses, were usually not progressive but regressive and thus mostly had the oppo-
site effect, that is, of increasing wealth inequalities.36 Perhaps an exception to this 
was formed by taxation out of direct necessity in cases of warfare, for instance in 
cities under siege, as these taxes could be higher and could target the wealthier 
segments of the population. 
Earthquakes, fires and floods 
Nature-induced disasters could also cause losses of capital, but mostly at a small 
scale.37 Arguably, the largest capital-destruction is caused by earthquakes. A main 
case in pre-industrial Western Europe, and a well-documented one, is the Lisbon 
earthquake of 1755. Still, the effect of the earthquake, and of the ensuing reforms 
initiated by the Marquis de Pombal, on wealth inequality in Portugal was limited. 
Burghers now came to the fore as new wealth owners, while the position of the 
Church was weakened, but the wealth inequalities remained, as most notably in the 
distribution of landownership.38 It would be interesting to investigate more of these 
cases, as also the case of eastern Sicily after the earthquake of 1693, especially when 
sources would permit to reconstruct wealth distribution before and after the disas-
ter, and again after the ensuing reconstruction. In doing so, it could also be interest-
ing to look at city-fires, since these hardly caused deaths but, albeit at a local scale, 
could massively destroy buildings and capital goods. In the past, towns were regu-
larly hit by big fires, in some cases destroying virtually all houses and other build-
ings. The Great Fire of London in 1666, which made three-quarters or more of all 
Londoners homeless, is a well-known example.39 
Another type of nature-induced disasters is floods hitting riverine and coastal 
areas. Like city-fires, they hardly killed any people but they did destroy land, har-
vests, buildings, cattle and other capital goods. Initially, this may have leveled 
wealth inequalities. In most empirical studies on specific cases, however, the domi-
nant conclusion is that in the longer run wealth inequalities were rather reinforced 
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or even sharpened as a result of these floods. Smallholding peasants often did not 
have the resources to buffer their exceptional losses and became susceptible to ex-
propriation, as argued for the early eighteenth-century floods that hit the northern 
coastal areas of Germany, for instance.40 Also, the reinvestment in protective em-
bankments in the wake of such inundations by wealthy urban citizens led in turn to 
a consolidation of absentee large-scale landownership.41 Even though at the land 
user level there may have been more continuity, floods did often lead to a wide-
spread loss of peasant land to urban investors and wealthy elite office-holders.42 
With regard to wealth inequality there was therefore mostly no levelling effect of 
pre-industrial floods, on the contrary. 
Pandemics 
Large epidemics, and most particularly the Black Death, are also mentioned as 
forces in levelling wealth inequality. The suggested logic behind this equitable effect 
is the decimation of people while keeping capital intact, thereby tilting the econom-
ic balance in favour of labour.43 According to this supply-and-demand line of rea-
soning, the gap between elites and the rest of the population, including peasants 
and labourers, was narrowed, as higher wages, easier mobility, reduced extra-
economic impositions, and greater opportunity to purchase property, made post-
pandemic societies more equal. This effect can be expected first and foremost in 
the distribution of income, but eventually also in that of wealth. 
This hypothesis requires some critical perspectives, however. First, the current 
attention for the redistributive effects of pandemics diverts our attention from the 
underlying and more long term inequality trends. Even the catastrophic Black 
Death, which has been proclaimed as perhaps the most redistributive shock, affect-
ed societies mostly only on a scale of decades rather than centuries. The optimist 
view on “The Golden Age of Labour” and reduced inequality levels, has for been 
nuanced. For several societies, studies have found only a modest redistributive ef-
fect, an effect that, moreover, occurred not immediately after the Black Death and 
that lasted less than a century. Moreover, this effect is in most cases ascertained for 
wages, not for wealth, and the effect on wealth distribution would have been only 
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fare), as argued for modern cases.35 In the pre-industrial period, war was indeed one 
of the main motivations for taxation. However, in the Middle Ages this taxation 
was only occasional and tax rates were quite low, so this did not have a strong ef-
fect on wealth inequality. In the early modern period, taxes became more general 
and substantial, but the taxes levied by central rulers in order to cover military ex-
penses, were usually not progressive but regressive and thus mostly had the oppo-
site effect, that is, of increasing wealth inequalities.36 Perhaps an exception to this 
was formed by taxation out of direct necessity in cases of warfare, for instance in 
cities under siege, as these taxes could be higher and could target the wealthier 
segments of the population. 
Earthquakes, fires and floods 
Nature-induced disasters could also cause losses of capital, but mostly at a small 
scale.37 Arguably, the largest capital-destruction is caused by earthquakes. A main 
case in pre-industrial Western Europe, and a well-documented one, is the Lisbon 
earthquake of 1755. Still, the effect of the earthquake, and of the ensuing reforms 
initiated by the Marquis de Pombal, on wealth inequality in Portugal was limited. 
Burghers now came to the fore as new wealth owners, while the position of the 
Church was weakened, but the wealth inequalities remained, as most notably in the 
distribution of landownership.38 It would be interesting to investigate more of these 
cases, as also the case of eastern Sicily after the earthquake of 1693, especially when 
sources would permit to reconstruct wealth distribution before and after the disas-
ter, and again after the ensuing reconstruction. In doing so, it could also be interest-
ing to look at city-fires, since these hardly caused deaths but, albeit at a local scale, 
could massively destroy buildings and capital goods. In the past, towns were regu-
larly hit by big fires, in some cases destroying virtually all houses and other build-
ings. The Great Fire of London in 1666, which made three-quarters or more of all 
Londoners homeless, is a well-known example.39 
Another type of nature-induced disasters is floods hitting riverine and coastal 
areas. Like city-fires, they hardly killed any people but they did destroy land, har-
vests, buildings, cattle and other capital goods. Initially, this may have leveled 
wealth inequalities. In most empirical studies on specific cases, however, the domi-
nant conclusion is that in the longer run wealth inequalities were rather reinforced 
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or even sharpened as a result of these floods. Smallholding peasants often did not 
have the resources to buffer their exceptional losses and became susceptible to ex-
propriation, as argued for the early eighteenth-century floods that hit the northern 
coastal areas of Germany, for instance.40 Also, the reinvestment in protective em-
bankments in the wake of such inundations by wealthy urban citizens led in turn to 
a consolidation of absentee large-scale landownership.41 Even though at the land 
user level there may have been more continuity, floods did often lead to a wide-
spread loss of peasant land to urban investors and wealthy elite office-holders.42 
With regard to wealth inequality there was therefore mostly no levelling effect of 
pre-industrial floods, on the contrary. 
Pandemics 
Large epidemics, and most particularly the Black Death, are also mentioned as 
forces in levelling wealth inequality. The suggested logic behind this equitable effect 
is the decimation of people while keeping capital intact, thereby tilting the econom-
ic balance in favour of labour.43 According to this supply-and-demand line of rea-
soning, the gap between elites and the rest of the population, including peasants 
and labourers, was narrowed, as higher wages, easier mobility, reduced extra-
economic impositions, and greater opportunity to purchase property, made post-
pandemic societies more equal. This effect can be expected first and foremost in 
the distribution of income, but eventually also in that of wealth. 
This hypothesis requires some critical perspectives, however. First, the current 
attention for the redistributive effects of pandemics diverts our attention from the 
underlying and more long term inequality trends. Even the catastrophic Black 
Death, which has been proclaimed as perhaps the most redistributive shock, affect-
ed societies mostly only on a scale of decades rather than centuries. The optimist 
view on “The Golden Age of Labour” and reduced inequality levels, has for been 
nuanced. For several societies, studies have found only a modest redistributive ef-
fect, an effect that, moreover, occurred not immediately after the Black Death and 
that lasted less than a century. Moreover, this effect is in most cases ascertained for 
wages, not for wealth, and the effect on wealth distribution would have been only 
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more indirect. Only for cases in Italy a longer lasting effect of the Black Death on 
wealth inequality is established with certainty (see below). 
Second, and even more importantly, the effect of any pandemic, especially in 
the longer run, is mediated by the existing political and social organization. This 
point was made already decades ago. For Eastern Europe it was hypothesized, for 
instance, that the population decline in the Black Death period and the resulting 
labour scarcity were followed by, or even gave rise to more intensive elite exploita-
tion and inequality.44 It was Robert Brenner who noted in the 1980s, by using this 
example and comparing it to the English experience, that a substantial decline of 
population thus not automatically translated into more equity and freedom, as sim-
ple supply and demand theories would predict, but could also result in the oppo-
site.45 Likewise, the depopulation of the Castillian-Granada frontier area in this 
period, as a result of epidemics, military insecurity and the expulsion of the Muslim 
population, is argued to have favoured the rise of large landownership and an ex-
pansion of seigneurial power there, leading to a situation where powerful lords 
dominated a near-landless rural population.46 
As these examples indicate, the roles of different coordination systems in place, 
and the relative position of different actors and groups within these systems, are 
crucial in shaping the effects of massive death. This effect, as with the Black Death, 
ws very different in, for instance, a society dominated by powerful lords, as in parts 
of Eastern Europe and the Spanish frontier areas, or in a society dominated by 
open markets for land, labour and capital, as Northern Italy, or by an associational 
system dominated by independent, freeholding peasants, as the Campine area or 
Drenthe in the Low Countries. Rather than an inevitable drive towards redistribu-
tion after catastrophic shocks such as the Black Death, there are redistributive out-
comes that are not unilinear. Outcomes sometimes even vary in their direction, 
while the effects also vary in intensity and are mostly not structural but only limited 
in time. 
 To be sure, any statement about the effect of the Black Death is plagued by 
the fact that inequality data for the pre-1348 period are very scarce, which makes it 
hard, and in many cases even impossible, to directly observe its effect on wealth 
distribution, let alone isolate it from other factors. For Germany, a few cases have 
been found where data on wealth distribution for the second half of the fourteenth 
is available, but only for one case (Quedlinburg) there is data from the pre-Black 
Death period.47 Exactly in this case, the effect of the Black Death is hard to isolate, 
because the distance between the early source (1310) and the next fiscal source is 
almost two centuries, if I see correctly. For other parts of Europe, information for 
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this early period is even scarcer. The case of Northern and Central Italy may be 
somewhat different, however, in two respects. First, there is a small (but compared 
to other parts of Europe still remarkable) number of fiscal sources on wealth distri-
bution available from the pre-1348 period and, second, in some cases these do al-
low us to observe an equalizing effect. In Lucca, there was a clear drop in inequality 
after the Black Death, with the Gini dropping some 16 percentage points from 
1331 to 1386 (the dates closest by the disaster).48 However, in 1411 the pre-Black 
Death level was already surpassed again, followed by a further rise of inequality to 
unprecedented levels during the remainder of the fifteenth century. The same ap-
plies to Poggibonsi, where after a similar rebound of inequality its rise further pro-
ceeded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to Gini’s more than 20 
percentage points higher than they had been before the Black Death. Other locali-
ties for which pre-1348 data is available, Antella and Santa Maria Impruneta in Tus-
cany, hardly or not show a drop in inequality after the Black Death at all, while they 
did see a rise in inequality in the centuries thereafter.49 
Likewise, the material for the Italian region of Piedmont, which includes only 
one datapoint for the pre-Black Death period for two cities each, shows that wealth 
inequality declined in the period 1348-1450, but that this followed by a long rise of 
wealth inequality, with the 1348-level reached already around 1500.50 Moreover, the 
vast mortality of 1630, in several parts of Italy equaling that of 1348, or perhaps 
even exceeding it, and blessed with far more datapoints before and after the pan-
demic, did not have a inequality reducing effect at all, but rather went along with a 
further rise of wealth inequality,51 again suggesting that context is more important 
than population losses per se. In this case, a major component in this context was 
formed by inheritance rules. While systems of partible inheritance had facilitated a 
levelling effect of pandemics and their massive mortality, in seventeenth-century 
Italy institutions that had been developed in the meantime, including the fideicom-
missum, were rather geared towards keeping properties intact and undivided. In the 
seventeenth century in many parts of Northern and Central Italy more than half, or 
in some regions even up to three-quarters of the land, was bound by entails or in 
the dead hand, now disallowing fragmentation or dispersal of landownership.52 Al-
so, in several regions, as perhaps most clearly in Tuscany, in the meantime a pro-
cess had taken place in which urban elites, in part by using the opportunities the 
markets for land, lease, labour and capital had offered them, had first amassed 
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more indirect. Only for cases in Italy a longer lasting effect of the Black Death on 
wealth inequality is established with certainty (see below). 
Second, and even more importantly, the effect of any pandemic, especially in 
the longer run, is mediated by the existing political and social organization. This 
point was made already decades ago. For Eastern Europe it was hypothesized, for 
instance, that the population decline in the Black Death period and the resulting 
labour scarcity were followed by, or even gave rise to more intensive elite exploita-
tion and inequality.44 It was Robert Brenner who noted in the 1980s, by using this 
example and comparing it to the English experience, that a substantial decline of 
population thus not automatically translated into more equity and freedom, as sim-
ple supply and demand theories would predict, but could also result in the oppo-
site.45 Likewise, the depopulation of the Castillian-Granada frontier area in this 
period, as a result of epidemics, military insecurity and the expulsion of the Muslim 
population, is argued to have favoured the rise of large landownership and an ex-
pansion of seigneurial power there, leading to a situation where powerful lords 
dominated a near-landless rural population.46 
As these examples indicate, the roles of different coordination systems in place, 
and the relative position of different actors and groups within these systems, are 
crucial in shaping the effects of massive death. This effect, as with the Black Death, 
ws very different in, for instance, a society dominated by powerful lords, as in parts 
of Eastern Europe and the Spanish frontier areas, or in a society dominated by 
open markets for land, labour and capital, as Northern Italy, or by an associational 
system dominated by independent, freeholding peasants, as the Campine area or 
Drenthe in the Low Countries. Rather than an inevitable drive towards redistribu-
tion after catastrophic shocks such as the Black Death, there are redistributive out-
comes that are not unilinear. Outcomes sometimes even vary in their direction, 
while the effects also vary in intensity and are mostly not structural but only limited 
in time. 
 To be sure, any statement about the effect of the Black Death is plagued by 
the fact that inequality data for the pre-1348 period are very scarce, which makes it 
hard, and in many cases even impossible, to directly observe its effect on wealth 
distribution, let alone isolate it from other factors. For Germany, a few cases have 
been found where data on wealth distribution for the second half of the fourteenth 
is available, but only for one case (Quedlinburg) there is data from the pre-Black 
Death period.47 Exactly in this case, the effect of the Black Death is hard to isolate, 
because the distance between the early source (1310) and the next fiscal source is 
almost two centuries, if I see correctly. For other parts of Europe, information for 
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this early period is even scarcer. The case of Northern and Central Italy may be 
somewhat different, however, in two respects. First, there is a small (but compared 
to other parts of Europe still remarkable) number of fiscal sources on wealth distri-
bution available from the pre-1348 period and, second, in some cases these do al-
low us to observe an equalizing effect. In Lucca, there was a clear drop in inequality 
after the Black Death, with the Gini dropping some 16 percentage points from 
1331 to 1386 (the dates closest by the disaster).48 However, in 1411 the pre-Black 
Death level was already surpassed again, followed by a further rise of inequality to 
unprecedented levels during the remainder of the fifteenth century. The same ap-
plies to Poggibonsi, where after a similar rebound of inequality its rise further pro-
ceeded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to Gini’s more than 20 
percentage points higher than they had been before the Black Death. Other locali-
ties for which pre-1348 data is available, Antella and Santa Maria Impruneta in Tus-
cany, hardly or not show a drop in inequality after the Black Death at all, while they 
did see a rise in inequality in the centuries thereafter.49 
Likewise, the material for the Italian region of Piedmont, which includes only 
one datapoint for the pre-Black Death period for two cities each, shows that wealth 
inequality declined in the period 1348-1450, but that this followed by a long rise of 
wealth inequality, with the 1348-level reached already around 1500.50 Moreover, the 
vast mortality of 1630, in several parts of Italy equaling that of 1348, or perhaps 
even exceeding it, and blessed with far more datapoints before and after the pan-
demic, did not have a inequality reducing effect at all, but rather went along with a 
further rise of wealth inequality,51 again suggesting that context is more important 
than population losses per se. In this case, a major component in this context was 
formed by inheritance rules. While systems of partible inheritance had facilitated a 
levelling effect of pandemics and their massive mortality, in seventeenth-century 
Italy institutions that had been developed in the meantime, including the fideicom-
missum, were rather geared towards keeping properties intact and undivided. In the 
seventeenth century in many parts of Northern and Central Italy more than half, or 
in some regions even up to three-quarters of the land, was bound by entails or in 
the dead hand, now disallowing fragmentation or dispersal of landownership.52 Al-
so, in several regions, as perhaps most clearly in Tuscany, in the meantime a pro-
cess had taken place in which urban elites, in part by using the opportunities the 
markets for land, lease, labour and capital had offered them, had first amassed 
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enormous wealth and, next, used this to become politically dominant.53 The means 
of non-economic leverage they had acquired in the process, in part even as a re-
sponse to the increasing scarcity of labour after the Black Death, also must have 
reduced, or even precluded, a redistributive effect of the next pandemic. 
The Italian evidence for a single pandemic, the Black Death, thus cannot be 
generalized. The long-effect of pandemics to a large extent depended on the social 
and institutional framework of the society in question. More generally, while shocks 
and catastrophes could produce some equitable outcomes, this was not always the 
case. Often, certain groups were better able than others to buffer these events, or 
even to benefit of them,54 owing to their preexisting advantages in resources and 
power, and thus enabling them to instrumentalize the shock to their benefit, and in 
the process exacerbating inequalities.55 
3. NON-CATASTROPHIC WAYS 
Newly colonized land 
We now move from shocks and catastrophes to non-catastrophic situations in 
which wealth inequality in pre-industrial Western Europe could be relatively low. 
One of these situations was where land was newly colonized. A possible example, 
colonized by Western Europeans, is the northeast of the United States in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. The English settlers were obsessed with acquiring 
their economic independency as common people, preferably by way of acquiring 
the ownership of a family-sized farm. It was the ideal of many to become an inde-
pendent yeoman, an ideal imported by the settlers from their homeland, where this 
status was much harder to realize.56 A relatively high degree of equity and wealth 
distribution seems to be realized here, even though there are two nuances. First, 
available figures do not show this equity, at a Gini of wealth distribution of 0.64-
0.67 in New England and other parts of the North,57 and, second, any possible eq-
uity went at the expense of the original inhabitants of the area. Still, among English 
settlers freeholding did become widespread. In eighteenth-century New Hampshire, 
Virginia and Connecticut, the proportion of freeholding men varied from 50 to 
90% per village. All figures show a presence of a large and strong segment of mid-
dling groups in American society. Still, the fact that this form of equity is not 
shown in the Gini’s, and that the original population is not included in the calcula-
tions, makes me a little hesitant about this case, even though it is a celebrated one 
in literature. 
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Europe itself, in the late medieval period in particular, offered even clearer ex-
amples of large-scale reclamation and colonization resulting in relatively equal dis-
tributions of landownership. A conspicuous case is Holland in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. This period saw a massive reclamation process, which resulted 
in a highly equal distribution of landownership. The reclamations in the marshy 
wilderness of Holland were carried out in a kind of no man’s land, where hardly any 
settlements or manors existed, no existing feudal structures could be extended or 
people living there could be coerced.58 The near absence of people and the ample 
availability of land, in combination with the specific socio-political setting, resulted 
in the choice of princes to try and attract people to occupy this inhospitable area. 
The princes thus lured people from outside by granting them favourable, and equi-
table, conditions for settlement. The colonists who carried out the hard clearing 
work were granted freedom and in practice became owners of the land, owing only 
a small nominal rent to the prince.59 All colonist families received a farm of similar 
size, about 12.5 hectares of land.60 The resulting dominance of a free, landowning 
peasantry in Holland remained a characteristic feature of the region up to the fif-
teenth century, as still two-thirds to three-quarters of the land was held in free 
property by small- and medium-scale peasant landowners. 
This situation of equality characteristic of medieval Holland was also found in 
areas on the German North Sea coast which here reclaimed in this period, in part 
by settlers from the northern parts of the Low Countries. In the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries, here, too, a situation developed of personal freedom, relative ma-
terial equity and broad political participation.61 I am not aware of direct figures on 
wealth distribution from Northern Germany in the late Middle Ages, but other in-
dications show how the rural society there was characterized by a relative degree of 
equity in property distribution. Up to the early modern period, the marshes and 
fens along the Northern German coast were dominated by peasants, yeomen and 
substantial farmers, who owned on average 70-90% of the cultivated area.62 This 
situation of relative equity, reinforced by egalitarian succession rules, was eroded 
from the sixteenth century, as a group of wage labourers started growing, eventually 
giving rise to polarization within society. 
It would be interesting to see whether other such examples of large-scale colo-
nization with low levels of wealth inequality exist in pre-industrial Western Europe. 
Spain and its massive southward conquest and colonization in the eleventh to thir-
teenth centuries could be an interesting case. A main difference is that the area was 
already populated and cultivated by people who largely remained there, including 
parts of the Muslim population, thus creating more continuity in property distribu-
 
58 P.A. HENDERIKX, Die Mittelalterliche Kultivierung der Moore im Rhein-Maas Delta (10-13 Jahrhundert), 
in Siedlungsforschung. Archäologie-Geschichte-Geographie 7, Bonn 1989. 
59 H. VAN DER LINDEN, De cope, cit., pp. 93-95, 160-182. 
60 Ibid., pp. 20-25. 
61 Ibid., pp. 173-182. 
62 O. KNOTTNERUS, Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, in Landholding and Land 
Transfer in the North Sea Area (Late Middle Ages - 19th Century), P. HOPPENBROUWERS, B.J.P. VAN BAVEL 
eds., CORN Publications 5, Turnhout 2004, pp. 149-186. 
BAS VAN BAVEL 
 
444
enormous wealth and, next, used this to become politically dominant.53 The means 
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substantial farmers, who owned on average 70-90% of the cultivated area.62 This 
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from the sixteenth century, as a group of wage labourers started growing, eventually 
giving rise to polarization within society. 
It would be interesting to see whether other such examples of large-scale colo-
nization with low levels of wealth inequality exist in pre-industrial Western Europe. 
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teenth centuries could be an interesting case. A main difference is that the area was 
already populated and cultivated by people who largely remained there, including 
parts of the Muslim population, thus creating more continuity in property distribu-
 
58 P.A. HENDERIKX, Die Mittelalterliche Kultivierung der Moore im Rhein-Maas Delta (10-13 Jahrhundert), 
in Siedlungsforschung. Archäologie-Geschichte-Geographie 7, Bonn 1989. 
59 H. VAN DER LINDEN, De cope, cit., pp. 93-95, 160-182. 
60 Ibid., pp. 20-25. 
61 Ibid., pp. 173-182. 
62 O. KNOTTNERUS, Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, in Landholding and Land 
Transfer in the North Sea Area (Late Middle Ages - 19th Century), P. HOPPENBROUWERS, B.J.P. VAN BAVEL 
eds., CORN Publications 5, Turnhout 2004, pp. 149-186. 
BAS VAN BAVEL 
 
446
tion. Also, this was no peaceful colonization, but one with the use of means of vio-
lence, possibly giving the nobility a great weight than in the Northwestern Europe-
an cases of colonization. Still, in the Valencia area, for instance, the peasant-settlers 
originally, in the thirteenth century, received fairly homogenous plots of land, thus 
perhaps creating some equity. The working of inheritance practises and the land 
market subsequently eroded any possible equity, however, as the region in the later 
Middle Ages was not characterized by low wealth inequality but rather fitted into 
the general Western European pattern.63 
More to the southwest, in the south of Castile and Andalusia, the turn to more 
unequal patterns was even more pronounced. Here, too, the original idea in the 
thirteenth century was to repopulate the area with medium-sized holdings of free 
peasants. They would even have been attracted to the area to act as peasant-soldiers 
and to contribute to the defence of these frontier areas, by offering them land, re-
sources and freedom.64 This would have created, as some have argued for the south 
of Castile, a fairly equal property distribution. However, in these border areas be-
tween Christian and Muslim territories, the semi-permanent insecurity and violence 
quickly led to militarization and a dominant role of a military elite, going hand-in-
hand with the rise of large landownership and the genesis of high levels of inequali-
ty, which remained in place up and into the modern period.65 That military insecuri-
ty indeed had been a main factor in shaping this pattern of inequality is suggested 
by later developments in the far South of Spain. As the Muslim Kingdom of Gra-
nada had fallen, and the Muslim military threat was gone, this area was re-populated 
in a non-militarized way and was characterized by a more egalitarian distribution of 
landownership,66 albeit at the expense of the Muslim population. 
More generally, relative equality in wealth distribution was not an automatic ef-
fect of colonization. Especially when the homeland was characterized by high 
wealth inequality, the colonization often followed the same pattern and copied it 
into the colonized area, since the actors organizing the colonization had obtained 
their wealth and political leverage in this setting and would likely copy this, or even 
extend this, overseas. In the seventeenth century, for instance, the settlers from the 
northern parts of the Low Countries, which by then had shifted from having a rela-
tively equal to a highly unequal distribution of wealth,67 created a new society on 
the southern tip of Africa. This Cape Colony, even though the colonists were quite 
prosperous, was characterized by inequality, unfreedom, slavery, privileges and mo-
nopolies.68 This situation resulted from the main actors being agents of the Dutch 
East India Company, the VOC, a company having become dominated by an oligar-
chy of rentiers, who were primarily interested in profits, at the expense of other 
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considerations. A situation of high inequity in the homeland did usually not result 
in an equitable colonization outcome. This more generally applies to unequal forms 
of colonization, or subjection through coercion or force, be it military or economic 
force. So, there is no automatic effect of colonization on wealth distribution, but 
the effect depends on the context in the homeland of the settlers, the composition 
of the settlers and the goals of the main actors shaping the way the colonization is 
organized. Only in a few cases, including a few important ones, this has indeed led 
to equitable distributions of wealth in newly colonized areas. 
Revolutions, revolts and processes of self-organization 
Revolutions and regime changes may be surmised to be able to bring about a 
reduction of wealth inequality. Their effect in pre-industrial Europe actually was 
limited, however. Most of them only had a negligible effect on wealth inequality, 
often just replacing one elite or ruler by another one, or had a short-lived effect. 
The limited effect on wealth inequality even holds for the most celebrated and suc-
cessful revolution of the pre-industrial period, the French Revolution. Even though 
new groups (wealthy burghers) came to the fore and old ones (nobility and clergy) 
lost, there was no fundamental change in the level of wealth inequality. Private 
wealth inequality only slightly decreased between c. 1780 and 1810 and in the post-
1815 decades even returned again to very high levels.69 Other revolutions or revolts, 
which were mostly smaller and less successful, or quickly repressed, left even less of 
a mark. 
The only revolutions or revolts that had a more fundamental or long-lived ef-
fect on wealth inequality were the ones that formed the end-stage of a long, mas-
sive wave of self-organization and societal change. The American Revolution 
formed the crown on the process of settlement by equity-craving colonists de-
scribed in the previous section. The same applies to the Glorious Revolution of 
1688. This revolution is highlighted in the literature as a major step towards mod-
ern equity.70 Actually, however, its effect was built upon a social and political con-
text that was shaped by a host of revolts, unrest and social movements, starting in 
the late fourteenth century, with the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381, and intermittently 
continuing from then.71 This movement included numerous cases of individual or 
local, small-scale resistance, which slowly eroded lordly power.72 Also, this was 
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perhaps creating some equity. The working of inheritance practises and the land 
market subsequently eroded any possible equity, however, as the region in the later 
Middle Ages was not characterized by low wealth inequality but rather fitted into 
the general Western European pattern.63 
More to the southwest, in the south of Castile and Andalusia, the turn to more 
unequal patterns was even more pronounced. Here, too, the original idea in the 
thirteenth century was to repopulate the area with medium-sized holdings of free 
peasants. They would even have been attracted to the area to act as peasant-soldiers 
and to contribute to the defence of these frontier areas, by offering them land, re-
sources and freedom.64 This would have created, as some have argued for the south 
of Castile, a fairly equal property distribution. However, in these border areas be-
tween Christian and Muslim territories, the semi-permanent insecurity and violence 
quickly led to militarization and a dominant role of a military elite, going hand-in-
hand with the rise of large landownership and the genesis of high levels of inequali-
ty, which remained in place up and into the modern period.65 That military insecuri-
ty indeed had been a main factor in shaping this pattern of inequality is suggested 
by later developments in the far South of Spain. As the Muslim Kingdom of Gra-
nada had fallen, and the Muslim military threat was gone, this area was re-populated 
in a non-militarized way and was characterized by a more egalitarian distribution of 
landownership,66 albeit at the expense of the Muslim population. 
More generally, relative equality in wealth distribution was not an automatic ef-
fect of colonization. Especially when the homeland was characterized by high 
wealth inequality, the colonization often followed the same pattern and copied it 
into the colonized area, since the actors organizing the colonization had obtained 
their wealth and political leverage in this setting and would likely copy this, or even 
extend this, overseas. In the seventeenth century, for instance, the settlers from the 
northern parts of the Low Countries, which by then had shifted from having a rela-
tively equal to a highly unequal distribution of wealth,67 created a new society on 
the southern tip of Africa. This Cape Colony, even though the colonists were quite 
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East India Company, the VOC, a company having become dominated by an oligar-
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considerations. A situation of high inequity in the homeland did usually not result 
in an equitable colonization outcome. This more generally applies to unequal forms 
of colonization, or subjection through coercion or force, be it military or economic 
force. So, there is no automatic effect of colonization on wealth distribution, but 
the effect depends on the context in the homeland of the settlers, the composition 
of the settlers and the goals of the main actors shaping the way the colonization is 
organized. Only in a few cases, including a few important ones, this has indeed led 
to equitable distributions of wealth in newly colonized areas. 
Revolutions, revolts and processes of self-organization 
Revolutions and regime changes may be surmised to be able to bring about a 
reduction of wealth inequality. Their effect in pre-industrial Europe actually was 
limited, however. Most of them only had a negligible effect on wealth inequality, 
often just replacing one elite or ruler by another one, or had a short-lived effect. 
The limited effect on wealth inequality even holds for the most celebrated and suc-
cessful revolution of the pre-industrial period, the French Revolution. Even though 
new groups (wealthy burghers) came to the fore and old ones (nobility and clergy) 
lost, there was no fundamental change in the level of wealth inequality. Private 
wealth inequality only slightly decreased between c. 1780 and 1810 and in the post-
1815 decades even returned again to very high levels.69 Other revolutions or revolts, 
which were mostly smaller and less successful, or quickly repressed, left even less of 
a mark. 
The only revolutions or revolts that had a more fundamental or long-lived ef-
fect on wealth inequality were the ones that formed the end-stage of a long, mas-
sive wave of self-organization and societal change. The American Revolution 
formed the crown on the process of settlement by equity-craving colonists de-
scribed in the previous section. The same applies to the Glorious Revolution of 
1688. This revolution is highlighted in the literature as a major step towards mod-
ern equity.70 Actually, however, its effect was built upon a social and political con-
text that was shaped by a host of revolts, unrest and social movements, starting in 
the late fourteenth century, with the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381, and intermittently 
continuing from then.71 This movement included numerous cases of individual or 
local, small-scale resistance, which slowly eroded lordly power.72 Also, this was 
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combined with a strong current of self-organization and broad participation of or-
dinary people, particularly in the pastoral areas of England.73 A new peak in social 
agitation occurred around the mid-seventeenth century, as many were taken by the 
desire for reform. The revolutionary movement of the Levellers, which had strong 
egalitarian overtones, for instance, made a heavy impact in the 1640s, during the 
Civil War.74 Much more than the Glorious Revolution, which was more aimed at 
reducing arbitrariness and not material inequality, these long-lasting and massive 
forms of self-organization and revolt may have pushed inequality down, although 
hard figures for England are notably absent. 
The role of massive self-organization also holds, and maybe even to a greater 
degree, for the “Communal Revolution” in Italy and the “Guild Revolution” in the 
Low Countries, which both rather were a two-century-long series of all kinds of 
movements, revolts and regime changes, mainly at the local level. The effect these 
had on wealth inequality was, therefore, not brought about by one single political 
shock, or revolution, but by a long, massive movement in which the self-
organization and actions of ordinary people played a major role. Moreover, it was 
not a direct effect, but an indirect one, that is, it was only effectuated through the 
institutional measures subsequently taken by these organizations and the local gov-
ernments they controlled. In order to do this, these bottom-up organizations, or 
associations, needed the political leverage, or at least the chance, to institute and en-
force these measures. This was a position that was gradually developed, or acquired, 
sometimes in peaceful ways and in other cases in more contentious ones. This 
drawn-out, massive process, which also has been coined the “Silent Revolution”,75 
did occur especially in Northern and Central Italy in the eleventh to thirteenth cen-
turies, and in the Low Countries in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, the cases 
highlighted above, but were also found in Switzerland, the west of Germany and 
the eastern coast of the Iberian peninsula, for instance. They were found in the 
towns, but in most of these areas, but least so in Italy, also in the countryside, with 
village communities, organizations for the commons, water management organiza-
tions and irrigation associations as the most conspicuous examples.76 In these cases, 
the self-organization of ordinary people was institutionalized in all kinds of ways, 
especially at the local level, with reducing effects on wealth inequality, as will be dis-
cussed further below. 
To be sure, even societies were these movements and revolts were defeated by 
an elite coalition could retain some equity as a result of their agitation and re-
sistance. An example is the peasant movement in the south of Germany. The re-
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volting peasants, who had used their communal organizations, were defeated and 
crushed after the Peasant Revolt of 1525, but still peasants in these areas, perhaps 
as a result of their revolts and resistance, were able to avoid the unfreedom and in-
equity of the so-called second serfdom to which their northern and eastern neigh-
bours were subjected. Some peasant revolts may even have induced rulers, 
alongside their appetite for repression of disturbances, to positive policy reforms, in 
order to reduce the stimuli for peasants to revolt.77 It would be highly interesting to 
see whether this also affected levels of wealth inequality, but I am not aware of 
studies on this. 
Progressive taxation 
Progressive, inequality-reducing taxation at the central or state level did not ex-
ist in pre-industrial Europe and neither did the redistributive systems we associate 
with the twentieth-century welfare states. First of all, continuous and regular tax re-
gimes at the level of the central state only developed from the sixteenth century. 
Before, states or rulers could only levy a tax in case of war, or other extraordinary 
circumstances, such as war, the birth of a royal heir or a crusade. These taxes were 
then used for the war efforts or for the upkeep of the bureaucratic apparatus, rather 
than to provide services or welfare systems for the population. Second, many taxes 
were regressive.78 Mostly, they consisted of excises or indirect taxes on consump-
tion goods. Wealth taxes were levied only very intermittently, often had flat rates 
and their size was very modest.  
One part of Western Europe where, by exception, steps towards a less regressive 
fiscal system were made, was the northern Low Countries. Here, the Habsburg regime 
in 1542 and again in 1568 tried to introduce taxes on exports and on commercial and 
industrial capital, and to make the tax on real estate proportional.79 The moves in this 
less regressive direction were halted, however, by the Dutch Revolt. In the new Dutch 
Republic, in the first half of the seventeenth century, taxes on transactions of goods, 
land or capital existed, but they mostly had a flat rate, thus burdening the small 
owners most.80 At the same time, two-thirds of taxes in Holland in 1600 were lev-
ied on basic necessities, rising to three-quarters in 1650.81 Taxation thus pressed 
hardest on the middling and lower segments of society. After the 1670s, taxation in 
Holland became based on a more equal footing, by levying more taxes on real es-
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Low Countries, which both rather were a two-century-long series of all kinds of 
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volting peasants, who had used their communal organizations, were defeated and 
crushed after the Peasant Revolt of 1525, but still peasants in these areas, perhaps 
as a result of their revolts and resistance, were able to avoid the unfreedom and in-
equity of the so-called second serfdom to which their northern and eastern neigh-
bours were subjected. Some peasant revolts may even have induced rulers, 
alongside their appetite for repression of disturbances, to positive policy reforms, in 
order to reduce the stimuli for peasants to revolt.77 It would be highly interesting to 
see whether this also affected levels of wealth inequality, but I am not aware of 
studies on this. 
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circumstances, such as war, the birth of a royal heir or a crusade. These taxes were 
then used for the war efforts or for the upkeep of the bureaucratic apparatus, rather 
than to provide services or welfare systems for the population. Second, many taxes 
were regressive.78 Mostly, they consisted of excises or indirect taxes on consump-
tion goods. Wealth taxes were levied only very intermittently, often had flat rates 
and their size was very modest.  
One part of Western Europe where, by exception, steps towards a less regressive 
fiscal system were made, was the northern Low Countries. Here, the Habsburg regime 
in 1542 and again in 1568 tried to introduce taxes on exports and on commercial and 
industrial capital, and to make the tax on real estate proportional.79 The moves in this 
less regressive direction were halted, however, by the Dutch Revolt. In the new Dutch 
Republic, in the first half of the seventeenth century, taxes on transactions of goods, 
land or capital existed, but they mostly had a flat rate, thus burdening the small 
owners most.80 At the same time, two-thirds of taxes in Holland in 1600 were lev-
ied on basic necessities, rising to three-quarters in 1650.81 Taxation thus pressed 
hardest on the middling and lower segments of society. After the 1670s, taxation in 
Holland became based on a more equal footing, by levying more taxes on real es-
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tate and luxury products, resulting in a decline of taxes in the form of excises on 
basic necessities, even though this share still remained substantial.82 In other states, 
however, central taxation remained even more clearly regressive, even to a substan-
tial extent,83 thus solidifying or even widening wealth disparities. 
To be sure, when the actual organization and partitioning of the fiscal levies 
was not in the hand of state officials but in that of local communities, the distribu-
tion of the burden could be more equitable. This was the case in some Catalonian 
localities, where local councils registered wealth and used this registration to set fis-
cal levies, which often happened in proportion to wealth.84 This practice lasted 
from the fourteenth century into the eighteenth, as it was replaced by more central-
ized systems with a more regressive character. Still, even the earlier system had 
been proportional, not progressive. Moreover, in other instances, as has been ar-
gued for northern Italy,85 local elites rather used their local power to shift the fiscal 
burden to people less closely involved in local decision-making. 
One of the few exceptions where inequality was directly and explicitly targeted 
through redistributive measures was under the short-lived rule of the Anabaptists, 
the most radical offshoot of the Reformation. The Anabaptists had clear ideas on 
economy and society; they disapproved of private ownership of property, believing 
that it should be used for the benefit of all, and they strove for common ownership 
of goods.86 In 1535, the Anabaptists rebelled in many places in Holland, such as in 
Amsterdam, their main centre, and also in Friesland, but their revolts failed and re-
pression by local and central authorities was often severe. The Anabaptists did 
manage to take power, however, in the town of Münster in Westfalia. Thousands of 
Anabaptists from Holland and Friesland decided to go there. The social and eco-
nomic revolution that was implemented in Münster in 1533-1535 reflects the ideas 
they held. Common ownership of property was introduced, accounts and titles 
were burned and personal valuables and money were confiscated.87 The town 
council was to provide food, clothing, and housing. The rule of the Anabaptists was 
quickly broken, however, and brutally repressed, and with it the progressive taxa-
tion they had propagated. 
Apart from the few exceptions like these, and turning to more peaceful situa-
tions, the most equitable types of taxes, both in the ways of levying and in the 
choice of expenses, were those levied by the bottom-up organizations and associa-
tions. Charity and social spending by these organizations, including foundations, 
poor boxes, almshouses, monasteries, hospitals and fraternities, amounted to some 
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1-3% of GDP, as calculated for the Netherlands and northern Italy in the period 
1400-1800.88 To be sure, most of the revenues of these organizations did not come 
from regular taxes, but from contributions, donations and returns from the proper-
ty owned by these organizations, which was mostly derived from earlier donations. 
While most of this was spent on poor or needy people from the lower and middling 
groups in society, and thus can be seen as social transfers, the lion’s share of con-
tributions was made by the middling groups, not by the wealthy.89 Even apart from 
the not so large absolute amounts transferred, the redistributive effect was there-
fore limited. 
Relative equity in taxation was also found with the taxes levied by water man-
agement boards around the North Sea coast for the maintenance and repair of 
dykes and sluices. The taxes of the water boards were based on landownership and 
therefore excluded the poor and landless, and they were proportional to the land-
ownership one used, and thus rather equitable. Still, they could be felt unequally. 
Since the money had to be paid in a very short time span in cash, it hit the lower 
middle classes hard, while large landowners could easily oblige.90 Even though this 
type of tax was not regressive, as central taxes were, it did not reduce wealth ine-
qualities either. 
Wealth limiting institutions at the local level 
The big, influential works on inequality almost exclusively focus on the state 
level, and on the wars, revolts and collapses taking place at this level. These works 
thus largely leave out the mechanisms at the local, non-state level and the periods in 
which central states were weak and did not carry much weight at the local level, as 
in many parts of Western Europe in the High and Late Middle Ages. This was the 
period in which town communities, villages, guilds and commons were largely re-
sponsible for organizing economic life at the local level, including the organization 
and allocation of taxation, and they often acted in order to reduce inequality. This 
points to the important role of other coordination and allocation systems than sole-
ly the state and the market. Western European societies also had the association, 
the community, the manor and the family, or kin, as important systems available. 
These each had other mechanisms and rules than state and market, and, even more 
importantly, other goals they prioritized, including providing security, offering soli-
darity, safeguarding ecological sustainability, reaching salvation, preserving a line-
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from regular taxes, but from contributions, donations and returns from the proper-
ty owned by these organizations, which was mostly derived from earlier donations. 
While most of this was spent on poor or needy people from the lower and middling 
groups in society, and thus can be seen as social transfers, the lion’s share of con-
tributions was made by the middling groups, not by the wealthy.89 Even apart from 
the not so large absolute amounts transferred, the redistributive effect was there-
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dykes and sluices. The taxes of the water boards were based on landownership and 
therefore excluded the poor and landless, and they were proportional to the land-
ownership one used, and thus rather equitable. Still, they could be felt unequally. 
Since the money had to be paid in a very short time span in cash, it hit the lower 
middle classes hard, while large landowners could easily oblige.90 Even though this 
type of tax was not regressive, as central taxes were, it did not reduce wealth ine-
qualities either. 
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level, and on the wars, revolts and collapses taking place at this level. These works 
thus largely leave out the mechanisms at the local, non-state level and the periods in 
which central states were weak and did not carry much weight at the local level, as 
in many parts of Western Europe in the High and Late Middle Ages. This was the 
period in which town communities, villages, guilds and commons were largely re-
sponsible for organizing economic life at the local level, including the organization 
and allocation of taxation, and they often acted in order to reduce inequality. This 
points to the important role of other coordination and allocation systems than sole-
ly the state and the market. Western European societies also had the association, 
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These each had other mechanisms and rules than state and market, and, even more 
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age, enhancing prestige, retaining a privileged position or other, widely differing 
goals. 
One of these systems is family, or kin, using inheritance rules as a main instru-
ment, but also employing other rules. Focusing on this would perhaps help to bring 
in the micro=perspective. More specifically, a system of partible inheritance may 
have contributed to reducing levels of wealth inequality, as suggested by isolated 
indications for Germany. Even though causality is hard to unravel, it is striking that 
in Germany a geographical overlap can be seen between the dominance of partible 
inheritance, the strength of rural communities and the spread of the 1525 peasant 
revolt.91 Another brake on processes of accumulation was that kin could prohibit 
the transfer of land to outsiders. The prevailing feeling was that land belonged to 
the family as a whole and should be kept within it. Restrictive inheritance customs 
and family claims clearly limited the possibilities to sell land. Relatives, sometimes 
even distant ones, could resist or annul the sale of land to anyone who was not a 
family member, and the family had to agree to the sale. It was also possible to claim 
back the land which had been sold by a relative, or buy it back for the same price, 
often as long as a year and a day after the original sale.92 In settings where manorial 
organization was prevalent, this was combined with manorial rules intended to keep 
holdings at equal size, to ensure the viability of holdings and the labour services 
connected to them.93 Manorial lords, as in the county of Namur up to the thir-
teenth century,94 frequently blocked sales of land, while manorial customs often 
prohibited the accumulation of land and the possession of multiple villeinage hold-
ings. In these manorial settings, however, wealth inequality more broadly will not 
have been low, as a result of the elevated position and large wealth of the manorial 
lords. Non-manorial settings where independent peasant had a strong position, 
with the family as major coordination system, will thus more likely have seen a 
wealth inequality-reducing effect of such rules. 
The coordination system that likely had the most elaborate and comprehensive 
set of inequality-reducing rules, however, was the associative one. Associations did 
reduce wealth inequality to a little extent by way of taxation – as discussed above– 
but mainly through restrictions on the transfer and accumulation of land and capital 
goods, imposing maximums on production, periodic redistribution of usage rights, 
etcetera. That they were able to do so, was the result of the lengthy process of self-
organization of ordinary people described above, a process that included strikes and 
revolts, but also more peaceful forms of collective action and the development of 
associations of ordinary people, particularly peasants and craftsmen. 
These wealth inequality limiting measures were thus found especially where this 
self-organization had been most successful. In many parts of Western Europe, we 
can see how in the Middle Ages, and especially in the twelfth to fourteenth centu-
ries, within local settings inequality was reduced, or at least kept in check, by limit-
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ing opportunities of transacting and accumulating land and capital, and by develop-
ing mechanisms of redistribution, through guilds, commons and communities. 
These measures were put into operation at the local level, where in this period also 
most of the exchange and allocation of land and capital (that is: wealth) took place. 
In the Western European towns, these wealth-limiting institutions and protection 
of small- and medium-sized property were found especially where guilds had a large 
say in urban politics, as in Flanders and Brabant and parts of Germany in the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries. Guild regulations often set a maximum on owner-
ship or equipment per craftsman, as for weavers on the number of looms to be 
owned, for spinners the number of spindles, for ironworkers the number of 
hearths, etcetera.95 Also, limits were placed on the number of apprentices and jour-
neymen each master could employ. Guild statutes often explicitly declared that 
these regulations were meant to equally share work and ensure equal livelihood, 
that is, at least among the masters.96 These regulations limited wealth inequality but 
also solidified the position of middling groups. Here, independent craftsmen, who 
owned the means of production, were the main actors, just as independent, land-
holding peasants through their associations were in the countryside (see below). 
A more extraordinary setting where the role of associations and independent 
middling groups can be observed, but still clearly so, is in fishermen’s villages. As is 
argued for late medieval England, fishing communities were often characterized by 
solidarity and egalitarian attitudes, solidified by risk-sharing arrangements.97 Across 
the North Sea, in in late medieval Flanders, coastal communities saw the develop-
ment of associations of shareholders in ships and fishing expeditions. This was ac-
companied by regulations restricting the number of crew members per vessel, or 
per trip, in order to avoid concentration or monopolization.98 Scattered evidence 
shows that these fishing communities indeed had rather egalitarian distributions of 
property in this period. 
Even more striking examples of the role of associations are found in the coun-
tryside. One of these examples is the Campine area, where much of the land was 
used in common, grazing was strictly regulated, use of the hay meadows was max-
imized, and commercial sale of peat, sods and wood was prohibited.99 In this re-
gion, in the sixteenth century, land and other forms of immovable wealth was 
“extraordinarily equally distributed”.100 Campine villages had Gini’s of wealth dis-
tribution between 0.5 and 0.56,101 with only a small number of peasant households 
owning either no land or possessing more than 10 hectares of land. Similarly, that 
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ing opportunities of transacting and accumulating land and capital, and by develop-
ing mechanisms of redistribution, through guilds, commons and communities. 
These measures were put into operation at the local level, where in this period also 
most of the exchange and allocation of land and capital (that is: wealth) took place. 
In the Western European towns, these wealth-limiting institutions and protection 
of small- and medium-sized property were found especially where guilds had a large 
say in urban politics, as in Flanders and Brabant and parts of Germany in the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries. Guild regulations often set a maximum on owner-
ship or equipment per craftsman, as for weavers on the number of looms to be 
owned, for spinners the number of spindles, for ironworkers the number of 
hearths, etcetera.95 Also, limits were placed on the number of apprentices and jour-
neymen each master could employ. Guild statutes often explicitly declared that 
these regulations were meant to equally share work and ensure equal livelihood, 
that is, at least among the masters.96 These regulations limited wealth inequality but 
also solidified the position of middling groups. Here, independent craftsmen, who 
owned the means of production, were the main actors, just as independent, land-
holding peasants through their associations were in the countryside (see below). 
A more extraordinary setting where the role of associations and independent 
middling groups can be observed, but still clearly so, is in fishermen’s villages. As is 
argued for late medieval England, fishing communities were often characterized by 
solidarity and egalitarian attitudes, solidified by risk-sharing arrangements.97 Across 
the North Sea, in in late medieval Flanders, coastal communities saw the develop-
ment of associations of shareholders in ships and fishing expeditions. This was ac-
companied by regulations restricting the number of crew members per vessel, or 
per trip, in order to avoid concentration or monopolization.98 Scattered evidence 
shows that these fishing communities indeed had rather egalitarian distributions of 
property in this period. 
Even more striking examples of the role of associations are found in the coun-
tryside. One of these examples is the Campine area, where much of the land was 
used in common, grazing was strictly regulated, use of the hay meadows was max-
imized, and commercial sale of peat, sods and wood was prohibited.99 In this re-
gion, in the sixteenth century, land and other forms of immovable wealth was 
“extraordinarily equally distributed”.100 Campine villages had Gini’s of wealth dis-
tribution between 0.5 and 0.56,101 with only a small number of peasant households 
owning either no land or possessing more than 10 hectares of land. Similarly, that 
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the hilly and mountainous parts of Tuscany in 1427 had a low wealth inequality, at a 
Gini of 0.52-0.53, compared to Florence and its surrounding plains with a Gini of 
around 0.8, has nothing to do with the supposed poverty of these mountainous ar-
eas, since these areas were actually quite flourishing with a diversified and produc-
tive economy, but rather with the more resilient peasant communities and their 
institutions at the local level, including common rights, grazing rights and strict 
regulations for using the forest and fields, as shown for the Casentino area.102 
All of this does not mean that a rise of wealth inequality was impossible within 
these associative settings. A case study on the common lands in the Lombard Alps 
in the eighteenth century shows how inequality in access to pastures and woods 
could actually grow, something also happening in the Friulian mountains, in the 
northeast of Italy, where rights in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies became more concentrated in a slow, but still noticeable process.103 Neither 
can we automatically attribute an equalizing effect to the associations. The guilds, 
and especially in the early modern period, could be dominated by a small group of 
master craftsmen. Also, and despite their role in stopping or even reducing inequal-
ities, both the guilds and the commons did also exclude people, privileging their 
members, mostly belonging to the middling groups in society.104 Similarly, as has 
been argued for organizations for the management of the commons, the effect of 
this organization was not automatic, but dependent on the exact rules of the game 
and the distribution of power within the commons, which the rules of the common 
sometimes not reducing but entrenching existing inequalities.105 In some cases, the 
rights to the commons could be linked to, and in proportion to, the distribution of 
private land or farmsteads (Castille, parts of England, the Po Valley, to mention 
some dispersed examples), thus not resulting into a reduction of wealth inequality, 
while in other cases the rights of the commons were more inclusive, more widely 
distributed or open to many (as in the Campine area, Navarra or parts of Scandina-
via), which did reduce inequalities.106 
We should, therefore, acknowledge the fact that the potentially equalizing effect 
of associational rules depended on their exact formulation and the distribution of 
rights. Still, my impression of the material would leads me to suggest, albeit tenta-
tively, that societies organized by way of associational systems in pre-industrial Eu-
rope often had more equal distributions of wealth than societies dominated by the 
market and/or the state as coordination systems. Even in cases where they did so-
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lidify existing wealth inequalities, the common rules did not increase them and may 
still have stopped their enlargement. Moreover, and this can be posited with less 
hesitation, societies with associational systems at least had the possibility and the 
institutional instruments to reduce wealth inequality, much more so than the other 
coordination systems, at least up to the twentieth-century state. 
However, in the early modern period these local associations, in town and 
countryside, and the local governments they influenced or even controlled, saw 
their institutional framework gradually eroded, albeit with different speed and form, 
by the growth of international trade, migration, interregional labour and capital 
markets, and also by state-formation and the rise of larger and more centralized bu-
reaucracies. The latter played an important role in this process, also because their 
fiscal systems were based on the taxing the monetary value of goods, services, pur-
chases, revenues and wealth, and thus worked in tandem with the market as alloca-
tion system. They were thus less compatible with associational systems, where 
especially inputs of land, labour and capital remained less subjected to monetary 
mechanisms and could thus less easily be expressed in monetary terms and taxed. 
Moreover, centralizing states and state elites were often nettled by the countervail-
ing, or in their eyes perhaps obstructing, power of associations and the local gov-
ernments they controlled, leading to fierce state attacks on these local 
independencies.107 Put in a very general way, all of these developments entailed or 
provoked processes of scale-enlargement, which in principle pushes up wealth ine-
quality when no countervailing mechanisms exist.108 These counter-mechanisms 
indeed were weakened in the same period, as a result of the same drawn-out pro-
cess, as the centralizing states and inter-regional markets as competing coordination 
systems eroded and marginalized the associations and communal organizations, 
which were mainly embedded in the local level. Thus also their inequality-reducing 
roles were weakened, although not fully and certainly not with the same speed and 
intensity in all parts of Western Europe. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
First a caveat. The preceding focused on wealth inequality. The information on 
income inequality in pre-industrial Europe is much scantier and reconstructions are 
often rather speculative. When more progress is made in this field, it may turn out 
to yield a somewhat different picture than the one developed here for wealth ine-
quality, as the two are linked but do not necessarily move in tandem. 
Now back to wealth inequality. As a general rule, wealth inequality in pre-
industrial Western Europe was high and wealth was mostly accumulated in the 
hands of small elites, a process intensified in the early modern period by urbaniza-
tion, population growth, proletarianization, economic development, state formation 
and scale enlargement. This insight, confirmed by many empirical studies, is now 
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often framed as part of “the very long Kuznets curve”. If this concept or frame is 
accepted too readily or applied to lightly, however, we run the risk of getting stuck 
with an image of the pre-industrial period as one of high and ever rising wealth ine-
quality per se. Furthermore, the only countervailing mechanism to this process, it is 
postulated by some recent studies, as most outspoken by Scheidel’s one, would be 
found in the redistributive effects of shocks, calamities and disasters, a view thus 
rendering society itself impotent in the face of rising wealth inequality. 
This paper, if only cursorily, shows two nuances or counter-arguments against 
this picture. First, it argues that disasters may indeed reduce wealth inequality, but 
only depending on the social and institutional context in which they take place. 
This context may directly affect the impact of a disaster on wealth inequality, be it 
into an disequalizing or equalizing direction, or it may produce a rapid return to the 
situation in place before the disaster. Cases where a disaster in pre-industrial Western 
Europe did have a direct and long-lasting effect on wealth inequality are very rare. 
Second, the paper shows how medieval societies did in some cases succeed in 
limiting wealth inequality in more peaceful ways. This was through longer-lasting, 
institutional counter measures, aimed at dividing property rights, limiting their 
transaction and setting maximums of ownership, production and use. These 
measures, or rules, were mostly embedded in other coordination systems than the 
market or the state, as most clearly in the associative system. Linked to this, these 
measures were developed and maintained at a local or at the most at a regional lev-
el. They were introduced in societies which either – as in a few exceptional cases - 
were reclaimed and colonized by free peasants, or which – in a much larger number 
of cases - underwent a very long period of self-organization of ordinary people, and 
especially the middling groups in society, who succeeded in obtaining a say in polit-
ical decision-making. To be sure, if the measures they took indeed reduced wealth 
inequality, it was mainly by protecting the property of the same middling groups, 
which still left the possibility that a smaller of larger group at the bottom of society 
was near-propertyless. 
The local and regional level where this was realized, however, was vulnerable to 
the scale-enlargement generated by centralizing states and expanding markets which 
were characteristic of the early modern period. In this period, the medieval islands 
of relative wealth equality were washed away by ever bigger waves of rising inequal-
ity. Also, with the erosion of the inequality-reducing measures instituted at the local 
level, societies did become more subjected to the disequalizing effects of popula-
tion growth, economic development and scale-enlargement. This was not an uni-
form and synchronous development, however, since the absolute levels of wealth 
inequality, the chronology of its rise and the mechanisms driving it, or halting it 
longer, all differed because of the specific context given by the factors highlighted 
here. Neither was this rise an ongoing development, to which no answer proved 
possible, as shown by the experience of Europe in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, as again a long-lasting period of self-organization of ordinary people suc-
ceeded in introducing a system of taxation and redistribution, now realized at the 
higher scale-level of the nation-states, a system only now undermined in a next 
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This article provides an overview of the research done in recent years by the ERC-
funded projects EINITE-Economic Inequality across Italy and Europe 1300-1800, 
and SMITE-Social Mobility and Inequality across Italy and Europe 1300-1800. It 
begins by discussing the sources available for reconstructing preindustrial economic 
inequality, especially in Italy, then it provides an overview of the methods which 
have been developed to produce reliable and homogenous information about 
inequality levels and trends. The method developed by EINITE to produce 
measures or distributions representative of broader aggregates (regions or entire 
states) is also discussed, as well as the techniques that can be employed to explore 
in a meaningful way such distributions to answer relevant historical questions. The 
second part of the article provides a comparison of the different trends followed by 
inequality during the late Middle Ages and the early modern period (ca. 1300-1800), 
in different pre-unification Italian states as well as in the northern and southern 
Low Countries. The third and final part of the article explores the main factors that, 
in different periods, led to inequality reduction (found only in the aftermath of the 
Black Death) or to inequality increase (which is characteristic of the entire early 
modern period). After having shown that traditional explanations, like that which 
would simply connect inequality growth to economic growth, do not seem to 
match well the newly-available estimates of inequality trends in the long run, the 
article focuses on institutional factors, and specifically on the development of the 
so-called “fiscal-military state”. Indeed, the rise of the fiscal-military state had 
redistributive consequences which are to be counted among the main drivers of the 
very significant increase in inequality, of both income and wealth, that occurred 
during the early modern period across most of the European continent. 
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